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Between the enactment of the original Federal Food and Drugs Act of i9o6' and
the passage of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,2 amendments to
the 19o6 Act were few and far between. While developments in the law came slowly
in that period of thirty-two years, the development of the industries affected by the
statute was tremendous. The proprietary drug business had expanded beyond belief;
the distribution of foodstuffs changed from a general practice of selling foods in bulk
to the point where packaged foods had become the rule on shelves of retail grocers.
Not only had the food and drug industries expanded and their methods changed, but
the making and selling of cosmetics had become an entirely new industry.
In addition to the above mentioned changes in the mechanics of distribution of
these products, changes were rapid in the American economic system in the twentyseven years between the passage of the original law and the introduction of the
so-called Tugwell Bill in Congress in 1933. New technical developments had been
attended by new methods of manufacture and distribution of food, drugs and cosmetics. New products were introduced, plant capacity increased, and competition
became more difficult to control with the increase of mass production, speedy distribution and the growth of the chain store.
The Department of Agriculture, and particularly the Food and Drug Administration thereof, which was charged with the enforcement of the Federal Food and
Drugs Act of i9o6, found itself handicapped not only by the lack of adequate funds
to provide for the sinews of war against illegal abuses, but by the fact that the weapon
which had been given to it in i9o6 to prosecute that war was becoming more and
more obsolete as the industries affected progressed both in the production and
distribution of their products.
For years the Food and Drug Administration hoped to remedy the legal defects
and administrative difficulties inherent in the old law. It was not until the advent of
increased interest in the problems of the consumer, which is so definite a part of the
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present National Administration, that the movement for a new law became such as
to give the Food and Drug Administration, industry and the public some hope that
a new and modern statute would replace the law of x9o6.
It is not the province of an article of this kind to discuss in detail the legislative
history of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938. Suffice it to say that in
the first session of the 73rd Congress in 1933 Senator Copeland introduced the Tugwell Bill prepared under the direction of Dr. Rexford G. Tugwell. This first measure
provided for a drastic permit control of factories, for inspection thereof, and, perhaps
of most importance, for compulsory grade labeling under which any food whose label
failed to bear the required symbol of quality and grade was to be deemed misbranded.
Five years elapsed between the introduction of the Tugwell Bill and the final
enactment of the law in 1938. In that time more than forty bills were introduced in
Congress; hearings were held before both Senate and House Committees, and President Roosevelt sent a special message to Congress recommending the passage of new
food and drug legislation.
In addition to the natural delays incident to such a complete revision of existing
law dealing with so complicated a subject, the final enactment of new legislation
was delayed by a controversy between the Department of Agriculture and the Federal Trade Commission concerning which administrative body should have control
over the advertising of foods, drugs and cosmetics sold in interstate commerce.
When in March of 1938 the Wheeler-Lea Act,8 amending the Federal Trade Commission Act, became law increasing the powers of the Federal Trade Commission
and giving it specific powers over the advertising of foods, drugs and cosmetics, the
last obstruction in the way of complete revision of existing law was removed.
Finally, after a minor controversy on the court review section of the pending bill,
the conference report on Senate Bill 5 was agreed to by the Senate and House and was
approved by the President on June 25, 1938 as Public Law No. 717.
Except for certain administrative provisions, the effective date of the law, in so
far as it related to food, was fixed at twelve months from the date of its enactment
or June 25, 1939. This intermediate period of one year was granted for the purpose
of permitting industry to analyze the new statute and its effect upon business, as well
as to permit the Secretary of Agriculture and the Food and Drug Administration to
take stock, provide, where necessary, new enforcement procedure and to issue rules,
regulations and standards provided for in the law.
This article deals with the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act and the Wheeler-Lea
Act only as they relate to food and is an attempt to show the possible effect of some
of their principal provisions upon the food industry.
II. DEFrNITONS AND STANDAMRs FOR FooD

Perhaps of most interest to the food industry is Section 4o of the new food law
which empowers the Secretary of Agriculture in the interest of consumers, where
2.52 STAT. 11
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such action in his opinion will promote honesty and fair dealing, to promulgate regulations establishing for any food under its common or usual name a reasonable
definition and standard of identity, a reasonable standard of quality, and reasonable
standards of fill of container.
The issuance of standards of identity and standards of quality by the Secretary of
Agriculture is not new, but the theory that the Secretary may issue such standards
for all food products 4 giving to them the force of law, thus making foods not labeled
in accordance therewith misbranded, is new. Under the old food law, the Secretary
of Agriculture has issued both standards of identity and standards of quality. The
standards of identity issued by the Secretary were not authorized in the Federal Food
and Drug Law of 19o6, nor were they enforceable by the Secretary of Agriculture
with respect to any manufacturer or distributor in so far as the labeling of commodities was concerned. In Service and Regulatory Announcement, Food and Drug
No. 2, Fifth Revision, November 5, 1936, it was specifically stated by the Secretary
that the standards of identity contained therein were issued as a guide for the officials
of the Department of Agriculture in enforcing the Federal Food and Drugs Act and
it was further stated: "They are so framed as to exclude substances not mentioned
in the definition, and in each instance they imply that the product is clean and
sound."

In its preface to the same Service and Regulatory Announcement, the Department
of Agriculture specifically states: "These standards of identity are not to be confused
with standards of quality or grade." (Italics added.) An example of a standard of
identity such as has been issued by the Secretary is the standard for Farina, appearing
in the above Announcement under the heading "Vegetable Products-A. Grain and
Flour:
"12. FARINA. The purified middlings of hard wheat other than durum."
The standards of quality heretofore issued by the Secretary have been issued only
since the adoption in i93o of the McNary-Mapes Amendment 5 and have been limited
to standards of quality for canned food.
The McNary-Mapes Amendment added a section to the misbranding provisions
of the old food law and provided that a food would be deemed misbranded "if it be
canned food and falls below the standard of quality, condition and/or fill of container, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture for such canned food and its
package or label does not bear a plain and conspicuous statement prescribed by the
Secretary of Agriculture indicating that such canned food falls below such standard."
An example of a standard of quality issued under the McNary-Mapes Amendment
is the following standard of quality and condition for canned pears:
'It should be noted that

§401

contains a proviso exempting "fresh or dried fruits, fresh or dried

vegetables or butter" from the promulgation of standards of identity and standards of quality, except that
standards of identity may be established for "avocadoes, cantaloupes, citrus fruits and melons" which
relate only to maturity and to the effects of freezing.
a46 STAT. ioxg (1930), 21 U. S. C. §So, "Foods," par. 5.
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"22. Standard canned pears are the normally flavored and normally colored canned
food consisting of (i) the normal sized, uniform sized, tender, peeled, mature, unblemished, unbroken halves of the fruit of the pear tree from which the calyx end and seed cells
have been removed, with or without removal of the internal stem, and (2) sugar solution
of sufficient strength, so that the liquid portion of the finished product reads not less than
14* Brix (read at the proper temperature for the instrument used)."
It will be seen that these two types of standard are not necessarily mutually
exclusive but that, generally speaking, a standard of identity under the old food
law was a definition of a product under its common name which excluded all other
types of product therefrom but did not deal with the quality of the product except
that it had to be "clean and sound" which, of course, was a requirement for the distribution of any food product under the old law. In other words, under the regulations of the Secretary issuing standards of identity under the old food law, a product
was not "Farina" in the eyes of the Food and Drug Administration unless it consisted of the purified middlings of hard wheat other than durum; but the Secretary,
if such a product were clean and sound, had no power with respect to the labeling
thereof as to quality.
A standard of quality, on the other hand, under the McNary-Mapes Amendment,
was one which set forth the condition and quality of the product named, which
condition and quality were absolutely necessary for distribution of such product in
interstate commerce unless it was to be labeled "Below U. S. Standard."
Under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, the Secretary of Agriculture is empowered to issue for all food products both standards of identity and
standards of quality, but it seems clear from the language of the statute and the
legislative history thereof that he may issue only one standard of identity and only
one standard of quality for a given food product. The Secretary of Agriculture is,
therefore, not empowered under the new law to fix compulsory grades for food
products as would have been the case if the Tugwell Bill had become law. He is
only empowered to fix a minimum standard of grade and quality for any given food
product with which minimum grade any food must conform if it is to be introduced
in interstate commerce without being labeled "Below U. S. Standard."
It is in connection with the labeling requirements of the new law that the new
power of the Secretary to issue legal standards of identity and standards of quality
will have the most immediate effect upon the food industry. Section 403 of the new
statute relates to "Misbranded Food." Sections 4o3(g) and 403(i) relate to the
labeling of products in connection with which standards of identity either have or
have not been prescribed.
Under Section 4o3(g) a food is to be deemed misbranded if it purports to be or
is represented as a food for which a definition and standard of identity has been
prescribed unless it conforms to such definition and standard and unless its label
bears the name of the food specified in the definition and standard and in so far as it
may be required by such regulations the common names of optional ingredients
present in such food.
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Under Section 4o3(i) a food is to be deemed misbranded if it is a product for
which a standard of identity has not been prescribed, unless it bears (i) the common
or usual name of the food, if any there be, and (2) if it is fabricated from two or
more ingredients, unless its label bears the common or usual name of each such ingredient, except that spices, flavorings and colorings, other than those sold as such,
may be designated as spices, flavorings and colorings without naming each. This
section requiring a statement of ingredients in cases of fabricated foods is modified
by a proviso to the effect that if compliance with it is impracticable or results in
deception or unfair competition, exemptions shall be established by regulations promulgated by the Secretary.
It will not be difficult for the food industry to conform to the provisions of Section
403(g), for if a manufacturer or distributor of a food product for which a standard
of identity has been promulgated knows what the law requires such food product to
consist of, he can, if a manufacturer, see that his product complies therewith, or, if a
distributor, secure a guaranty from the manufacturer to the effect that the product
complies therewith.
On the other hand, compliance with the provisions of Section 403(i) may result
in great difficulty for the food industry. Under the old food law, an article of food
which did not contain any added poisonous or deleterious ingredients was not to be
deemed adulterated or misbranded if it was a mixture or compound sold under its
own distinctive name if the name was accompanied on the same label or brand with
a statement of the place where the article had been manufactured or produced. Section 4 03 (i) of the present law takes the place of this section in the old statute, so that
many fabricated foods which were, practically speaking, exempt from the old food
law because sold under their own "distinctive names" will now be required to
bear the common or usual name of each ingredient on their labels unless they are to
be deemed misbranded.
It is true that Section 9o2(a) (2) of the new food law authorizes the Secretary of
Agriculture to designate, prior to June 25, 1939, foods having common or usual
names and to exempt such foods from the provision of Section 4o3(i) (2), requiring
statements of ingredients on labels of fabricated foods, pending promulgation of
standards of identity therefor. I do not believe that this section will be of much help
to manufacturers or distributors of fabricated foods sold under their own distinctive
names. Such products might be said to have common or usual names within the
meaning of Sections 4o3(i) (2) and 902(a) (2), but I doubt if the Secretary will feel
that he can issue standards of identity therefor. It seems probable to me, therefore,
that manufacturers and distributors of most fabricated foods will have to have statements of ingredients on label; by June 25, 1939, when Section 4o3(i) takes effect,
unless their products fall within the scope of regulations issued by the Secretary under
the power conferred on him by a proviso to the section to establish exemptions where
such labeling would be impracticable or would result in deception or unfair competition. It would seem, therefore, that if a manufacturer or distributor believes that
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certain of his food products are not subject to a definition or standard of identity ic
should urge the early promulgation by the Secretary of such regulations so that he
may determine prior to June 25, 1939, whether or not he can secure exemption for
such foods from Section 4o3(i).
Congress obviously recognized the fact that in some cases the requirement as to
the naming of ingredients would be unfair, but unless a manufacturer or distributor
of food products may know within a reasonable time whether or not his fabricated
foods are subject either to exemption or to the issuance of a stahndard of identity it
may well be that he will be required to state the ingredients thereon by reason of the
law's becoming effective before the scope of the exemption is defined.0
When a statement of ingredients will be deemed "impracticable" or such as to
result "in deception or unfair competition" is a matter of guesswork.7 Assuming
that either of these conditions exists with respect to a specified food product, I believe
that the exemptions granted by the Secretary under regulation may very well consist
of a blanket exemption from the naming of ingredients on labels if a manufacturer
of a fabricated food product sold under its own "'distinctive name" is willing.to file a
list of his ingredients with the Secretary. Such procedure would adequately safeguard the public and the consumer and would not force manufacturers to reveal to
their competitors a statement of the ingredients in their product which, as Congress
recognized, might result in unfair competition.
Under Chapter 7 of the new statute relating to general administrative provisions,
the Secretary is required to hold public hearings prior to the issuance of regulations
issued under certain sections of the statute. All other regulations to be issued by the
Secretary may be issued without public hearing. Thus, the Secretary may not issue
a definition or standard of identity for any food product without public hearing, so
that manufacturers and distributors of food products should follow closely notices of
the Department with respect to hearings on such standards. On the other hand,
regulations under Section 4o3(i), exempting from disclosure of ingredients those
6

The time problem is especially acute for but approximately six months remain before the effective

date of the statute and manufacturers and distributors of food products as a general rule purchase their
label requirements about twelve to eighteen months in advance. Most manufacturers and wholesalers have
been advised to buy labels in small lots until regulations have been issued but such advice will not save
the situation if regulations with regard to exemption from 54 03 (i) are not forthcoming.
Tit is most difficult to state types of food which would require the protection of exemption from
§4o3(i). The "impracticable" basis for exemption might apply to packages of assorted fabricated food
products in which case a statement of ingredients of all the products contained in the assortment could not
possibly be placed upon the package thereof. The "deception or unfair competition" basis for exemption
is, in my opinion, to be applied to so-called proprietary products. This view is borne out by the following
quotation from the Conference Report on S. 5 in the "Statement of the Managers on the Part of the
House":
"Label disclosure of ingredients of food.-The House amendment and the bil! as agreed to in conference require the labels of all food products, for which no definition and standard of identity have been
prescribed and which are made from two or more ingredients, to bear the names of each ingredient, except
spices, flavorings, and colorings, unless exempted by regulations on the ground that compliance is impracticable or results in deception or unfair competition. The conference agreement omits a provision of
the House amendment which exempted also proprietary products, when label disclosures would give competitors information they could not otherwise obtainon condition that the composition had been disclosed
to the Secretary." H. R. REP. No. 2716, 75 th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 23.
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fabricated foods where revealing such ingredients is either "impracticable" or might
result "in deception or unfair competition," may be issued by the Secretary without
public hearing and may be immediately effective. However, I believe that the policy
of the Department of Agriculture will be, wherever possible, to discuss proposed
regulations with the industry and to give the industry a proper opportunity to
express its views with respect thereto. 8
Section 4o3 (h) of the new law relates to the labeling of food products for which
standards of quality or standards of fill of container have been prescribed by regulations issued by the Secretary. Under this section, if a food purports to be or is represented as a food for which a standard of quality has been prescribed by the Secretary,
it will be deemed misbranded if its quality falls below the standard unless its label
bears in such manner and form as the regulations specify a statement that it falls
below the standard. Food will likewise be deemed misbranded if one for which a
standard of fill of container has been prescribed and if it falls below such standard
without the label bearing a statement to that effect. It should be noted that the Act
does not require the promulgation of standards of quality by the Secretary within
any given period of time. The task of issuing standards of quality for all food
'On Wednesday, December 28, 1938, subsequent to the completion of this article, the Secretary of
Agriculture issued regulations for the enforcement of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The
regulation with relation to exemption from the requirement of stating ingredients upon the labels of
fabricated foods reads as follows:
"(e) (i) A food shall be exempt from the requirements of clause (2) of section 4 030) of the Act if
all words, statements, and other information required by or under authority of the Act to appear on the
label of such food, cannot, because of insufficient label space, be so placed on the label as to comply with
the requirements of section 40 3 (f) of the Act and regulations promulgated thereunder. But such exemption shall be on the condition that, if the omission from the label of the statement of the quantity of the
contents affords sufficient space to state legibly thereon all the information required by such Clause (2),
such statement of the quantity of the contents shill be omitted as authorized by regulation (in) (2)
under section 403(e) of the Act, and the information required by such clause (2) shall be so stated as
prominently as practicable even though the statement is not of such conspicuousness as to render it likely
to be read by the ordinary individual under customary conditions of purchase.
"(2) In the case of an assortment of different items of food, when variations in the items which make
up different packages packed from such assortment normally occur in good packing practice, and when such
variations result in variations in the ingredients in different packages, such food shall be exempt from
compliance with the requirements of clause (2) of section 403(i) of the Act with respect to any ingredient
which is not common to all packages. But such exemption shall be on the condition that the label shall
bear, in conjunction with the names of such ingredients as are common to all packages, a statement in
terms which are as informative as practicable and which are not.misleading, indicating that other ingredients may be present."
It is obvious from a study of the above quoted exemption contained in the regulations of the Secretary
that only one of the bases for exemption has so far been considered b~ythe Department of Agriculture;
that ij an exemption based on the impracticability of stating ingredients upon the labels of such food
products. Both of the exemptions are based upon the lack of space on the label for the statement of
ingredients. In footnote 7, supra, I pointed out that this might well be the "impracticable" basis for
exemption fixed upon by the Secretary, but no basis for exemption is contained in the regulations on the
theory that to reveal the ingredients of any food product would result in "deception or unfair competition."
I, therefore, feel that the advice contained in the body of this article, that manufacturers and distributors
should urge the early promulgation by the Secretary of regulations exempting such food products from a
statement of ingredients because of unfair competition, is, if anything, more pertinent today than it was
when this article was written. One of the bases for exemption has not been covered in the Secretary's
regulations and in fairness to industry it should be so covered as soon as possible, so that on June 25,
1939, manufacturers and distributors of fabricated food may know that their products are correctly labeled
and whether or not such products are required to bear a statement of ingredients under 54o3(i)(2).
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products is obviously tremendous and the food industry should bear in mind that
standards of quality do not affect it until actually promulgated by the Secretary and
that such standards cannot be issued without the specific procedure prescribed by
Section 701(e) of Chapter 7 of the statute. Thus, no standard of quality may be
issued without public hearing and the opportunity being given members of the
industry to express their views with respect thereto.
It also should be remembered that under the statute as finally enacted it is
specifically provided that if any "actual controversy" exists as to the validity of any
order (which would include an order setting forth a standard of quality) issued by
the Secretary, any person who will be adversely affected by such order may at any
time prior to its effective date, i-e., ninety days after its issuance, file a petition with
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the circuit in which he resides or his principal place
of business exists, for a judicial review of the order.
The Circuit Court of Appeals is empowered to modify or affirm or set aside in
whole or in part an order of the Secretary. It is, however, provided that "the findings
of the Secretary as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive." It is interesting to note in this connection that in sections providing for
review by the Circuit Courts of orders of the Federal Trade Commission and the
National Labor Relations Board the respective statutes provide that findings of fact if
supported "by evidence" shall be conclusive, the word "substantial" not appearing in
such laws. The courts in construing the Federal Trade Commission Act and the
National Labor Relations Act have been inclined to read into such statutes the word
"substantial," and it would appear here as if Congress in using the word "substantial" in the court review sections of the new food law had forestalled the courts in
so doing.'
Another interesting point is that Section 7 01(f) (6) of the new food law provides:
"The remedies provided for in this subsection shall be in addition to and not in
substitution for any other remedies provided by law."
This section is of especial interest in connection with the issuance of standards of
quality when one remembers that under the McNary-Mapes Amendment of the old
food law, the courts restricted the powers of the Secretary to issue standards of quality
by considering the reasonableness of the standards issued.
In i93i , the Department of Agriculture issued regulations concerning canned
peas. Revised regulations were issued in May of 1932 to the effect that it was the
opinion of the Department that canned soaked dry peas belonged to the class called
'In connection with the conclusiveness of findings of fact and the requirement of public hearings, the
following cases should be of interest to a student of the new food law: Federal Trade Commn v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 26o U. S. 568 (923); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Pacific States Paper Trade Ass'n, 273
U. S. 52 (1927); Federal Trade Commn'n v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U. S. 67 (934); Florida v. U. S.,
292 U. S. x (1934); St. Joseph's Stock Yards Co. v. U. S., 298 U. S. 38 (1936); Morgan v. U. S., 298 U. S.
468 (1936); Washington etc. Coach Co. v. Nat. Labor Relations Bd., 301 U. S. x42 (1937); Federal Trade
Comm'n v. Standard Education Society, 302 U. S. X12 (1937); Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. I
(938); Nat. Labor Relations Bd. v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U. S. 333 (938); Consolidated Edison
Co. v. Nat. Labor Relations Bd., 59 Sup. Ct. 206 (3938).
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"canned peas" and that, being mature, they were substandard and would have to bear
the substandard legend if they were to be introduced in interstate commerce without being deemed misbranded. The regulations provided that the following statement, "Below U. S. Standard, low quality, but not illegal, soaked dry peas," must be
placed upon the label of all such products.
This ruling very seriously affected the Morgans, who were engaged in the canning
business in Indiana and who had developed a tremendous business in the sale of
peas matured upon the vine, soaked in water so as to render them tender and
palatable, and sold in cans upon which was inscribed in plain language the
fact that the product therein was prepared from dry peas. The Morgans went
into equity and brought an action against Val Nolan, United States Attorney
for the Southern District of Indiana, seeking in the bill of complaint to enjoin him
from the enforcing of the Department of Agriculture's regulations against the Morgans and their product prepared from dry mature peas. The Morgans contended

that the regulations were invalid because they were unreasonable, arbitrary, and unauthorized under the provisions of the McNary-Mapes Amendment, and also contended that the Food and Drugs Act as amended by the McNary-Mapes Amendment
violated the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that it
took plaintiffs' property without due process and without just compensation. They
further contended that the law as amended violated the Sixth Amendment of the
Constitution, in that no standard of guilt or of liability to seizure was set up in the
statute ascertainable from the statute itself, but that guilt or liability to seizure was
made dependent upon "reasonable" standards which might be established by the
Secretary of Agriculture.
The court stated'0 that if the provisions in question could be found unreasonable
and inconsistent with the Act itself, it would not be necessary for the court to consider the constitutionality of the McNary-Mapes Amendment. The court then found
that the Department of Agriculture could not claim that mature dry peas, as processed by the Morgans, did not constitute a wholesome and a pure food. It stressed
the purpose of the statute to protect the consumer and to inform purchasers of what
they were buying. It found that the purchaser could not be misled when the label,
as that of the Morgans, contained the plain statement that the contents were prepared
from dry peas.
The court further found that the use of the legend required by the regulations
would do irreparable injury to the Morgans for which there was no adequate remedy
at law, and it, therefore, ordered that an injunction be issued enjoining the United
'States Attorney from enforcing the regulations.
This case was appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
which affirmed the order of the District Court and also found no reas,t to consider'
the constitutionality of the McNary-Mapes Amendment 1
"Morgan v. Nolan, 3 F. Supp. 143 (S. D. Ind. 1933).
'1Nolan v. Morgan, 69 F. (2d) 47! (C. C. A. 7th, 1934).
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No later cases contesting the constitutionality of the McNary-Mapes Amendment
have been decided by the courts and it is apparently the opinion of the solicitors of
the Department of Agriculture that there is no question as to the constitutionality of
such a delegation of power. Congress has, therefore, approved the extension of the
powers of the Secretary to the point where under the new statute he may prescribe
standards of quality for all food products. 2 It would seem that under the new
statute, and particularly the court review sections thereof, the members of the food
industry will have the opportunity to protect themselves, as did the Morgans under
the old food law, if the standards of quality promulgated by the Secretary under the
new law are. unreasonable and arbitrary.
III.

LABELING AND ADvEPTISING

The passage of the new Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act shortly after the
passage of the Wheeler-Lea Act, amending the Federal Trade Commission Act, in
March of 1938 changes considerably the problems of the food industry with regard
to the labeling and advertising of food products.
Under the old Food and Drugs Act of i9o6, Section 8 provided that a food would
be deemed misbranded:
"Fourth. If the package containing it or its label shall bear any statement, design, or
device regarding the ingredients or the substances contained therein, which statement,
design, or device shall be false or misleading in any particular." (Italics added.)
The entire emphasis of the old Food and Drugs Act was upon the protection of the
consumer. On the other hand, the original Federal Trade Commission Act, when
adopted in 1914, was a sort of third arm of the anti-trust laws and the entire purpose
of the original Federal Trade Commission Act was the same as the purpose of the
anti-trust laws, to protect competitors in business-there was no thought of the
consumer at all.
Under the old Food and Drugs Act of i9o6, the powers of the Food and Drug
Administration were limited to statements false "in any particular" on labels of
foods and drugs. The term "label" was defined so as to include any printed matter
accompanying the food or drug product when delivered to the consumer. 18 In other
words, the powers of the Food and Drug Administration did not extend to advertising media other than labels on packages or circulars which were included in the
package when sold. It is obvious, however, that there was a definite control over a
certain type of advertising, which may be called "point of sale" advertising, in the old
Food and Drugs Act, although the scope of such control was strictly limited.
Under the original Federal Trade Commission Act, there was nothing in that
statute which gave to the Federal Trade Commission, in specific language, any control over false advertising, but it was soon determined that false advertising came
within the fundamental intent of the statute as expressed in Section 5 as follows:
I

With the few exceptions noted, supra note 4.

"U. S. DEP'T AGa., REOuLATnoNs
(soth Rev. 193o) Reg. 14(a).
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"The Commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships
or corporations ... from using unfair methods of competition in commerce."

False advertisements were considered "unfair methods of competition" and so were
brought within the meaning and the scope of the original Federal Trade Commission
Act.
So from 1914 to x938 the advertising and labeling of foods and drugs were controlled by two statutes which were not integrated at all from the administrative point
of view. It was partially with the idea of increasing the efficiency of control over
advertising that plans were laid for amending both the Food and Drugs Act of 19o6
and the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914.
It is well known that there was considerable difficulty during the legislative
history of the new food law in determining which administrative body should
have control over the advertising of foods, drugs, cosmetics and devices. The controversy was resolved by Congress which lifted out of the then pending Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Bill those provisions relating to the false advertising of
such products and put them into one of the pending bills amending the Federal
Trade Commission Act.
The result is that the Federal Trade Commission now is given specific control
over the advertising of these products and, in addition, by reason of the outlawing of
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce," has the power to take the
consumer approach to advertising. The Food and Drug Administration controls
the same advertising media that were controlled by it under the old Food and Drugs
Act, but is now empowered to prevent manufacturers and distributors of food
products from failing to state things on labels and in circulars necessary for the
protection of the consumer.
Section 403(a) of the new Act provides that a food shall be deemed to be
misbranded.
"(a) If its labeling is false or misleading in any particular."
Sections 201(m) and 201(n) of the new Act read as follows:
"(m) The term 'labeling' means all labels and other written, printed, or graphic matter
(x) upon any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article.
"(n) If an article is alleged to be misbranded because the labeling is misleading, then
in determining whether the labeling is misleading there shall be taken into account (among
other things) not only representations made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, or any combination thereof, but also the extent to which the labeling fails to reveal
facts material in the light of such representations or material with respect to consequences
which may result from the use of the article to which the labeling relates under the conditions of use prescribed in the labeling thereof or under such conditions of use as are
customary or usual."

Section 15 of the Wheeler-Lea Act reads as follows:
"Sec. 15. For the purposes of sections 12, 13, and 14"(a) The term 'false advertisement' means an advertisement, other than labeling,
which is misleading in a material respect; and in determining whether any advertisement
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is misleading, there shall be taken into account (among other things) not only representations made or suggested by statement, word, design, device, sound, or any combination
thereof, but also the extent to which the advertisement fails to reveal facts material in the
light of such representations or material with respect to consequences which may result
from-the use of the commodity to which the advertisement relates under the conditions
prescribed in said advertisement, or under such conditions as are customary or usual. No
advertisement of a drug shall be deemed to be false if it is disseminated only to members
of the medical profession, contains no false representation of a material fact, and includes,
or is accompanied in each instance by truthful disclosure of, the formula showing quantitatively each ingredient of such drug."
It will be seen that the language of the comparable sections of the two statutes is
almost identical.
We now have two federal statutes relating to misrepresentation of food; the new
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act giving the Food and Drug Administration very
stringent, very broad powers over representations on labels and in circulars sold
with the product; the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, giving the Federal Trade Commission similar powers over all other types of advertising used in
connection with food products.
Two problems of intense interest to the food industry are raised by these facts:
i. It should be noted that the Food and Drug Administration's power over misrepresentation of food, limited in scope as it is, is nevertheless more stringent than
is .that of the Federal Trade Commission. Section 4o3(a) of the new food law retains
the language of the old food law and provides that a food shall be deemed misbranded if its labeling is false or misleading in any particular (italics added). Section
15 of the Federal Trade Commission Act defines the term "false advertisement" as
one which is misleading "in a material respect" (italics added).
2. Both enforcement bodies are charged with the determination as a question of
fact of "the extent to which the labeling (advertisement) fails to reveal facts material in the light of such representations or material with respect to consequences which
may result from the use of the article (commodity) to which the labeling (advertisement) relates under the conditions prescribed."
It seems obvious that the position of the industry with respect to its labeling and
advertising will be most difficult if there is not some coordination between the two
administrative bodies. For instance, a statement in advertising might be held not to
be misleading in a materialrespect by the Federal Trade Commission where the same
statement on a label or in a circular sold with the merchandise might well be held
to be misleading in some way by the Food and Drug Administration and therefore
to be deemed a misbranding under the phrase "misleading in any particular." Second, that which the Food and Drug Administration held not to be a vital failure to
reveal facts material to the use of a product might, in an advertisement, be held under
the Wheeler-Lea Act to be a vital failure to reveal such facts and therefore false
advertising and an unfair and deceptive act or practice under the Federal Trade
Commission Act, as amended. Unless the food industry can be assured in some way
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that there will be some similarity of approach to these problems, the job of the man
in any business charged with preparation of labels and control of advertising will be
such as to require the wisdom of a sage.
Here, it is well, I believe, to mention that the new food law, Section 4o3(j),
provides that a food shall be deemed to be misbranded if it purports to be or is
represented for special dietary uses unless its label bears such information concerning
its vitamin, mineral and other dietary properties as the Secretary determines to be
and by regulation prescribes as necessary in order fully to inform purchasers as to its
value for such uses.
Let us assume a case where a manufacturer or distributor of a dietary food com.
plies with the regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture as to matters necessary in
order fully to inform purchasers as to its value for dietary use. Such a manufacturer,
under the definition of the term "false advertising" in the Wheeler-Lea Act, might
be held by the Federal Trade Commission, using precisely the same material in his
advertising as was required by the Food and Drug Administration, to have failed to
reveal facts material under the conditions of use prescribed in the advertisement. Industry should, without question, make every attempt to urge the Food and Drug
Administration and the Federal Trade Commission to coordinate their views with
regard to the advertising and labeling of food products.
On November 29, 1938, W. T. Kelley, Chief Counsel for the Federal Trade Commission, addressed the Associated Grocery Manufacturers of Amercia at The
Waldorf Astoria Hotel in New York. In that address he facetiously said:
"Further, food isn't just food any more. You know, it used to be that food was just
something to satisfy hunger, to keep you from getting too hungry before the next meal
time rolled around. But today, with the doctors finding such dose connection between diet
and health, both in preventing ailments as well as correcting them, and with the food
manufacturers making such therapeutic claims for their products, it is difficult for one to
determine, when he dines, whether he is taking a dose of food or eating a remedy."
(Italics added.)
It seems to me that this comment, no matter how facetiously intended, expresses a
very real problem for the food industry under these statutes.
IV.

EMERGENCY PERMIT CoNTRoL

In 1933 when the original Tugwell Bill was introduced, it contained a drastic
provision to the effect that the Secretary of Agriculture might issue regulations controlling the manufacture and packing of all food products when the conditions surrounding manufacture might result in such products being injurious to health, and
their injurious nature could not be adequately determined after the products had
entered interstate commerce, The Secretary was authorized to require manufacturers
and packers to obtain a permit to operate their plants and to comply with the conditions contained in such permit. If the Secretary decided to revoke or suspend such
permit, the manufacturer in question lost his right to ship the food product packed
by him in interstate commerce. Among other grounds for suspension of a permit
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was the refusal to permit the inspection of the factory. This plan for control of the
manufacture and packing of food products was analogous to that contained in
Senator O'Mahoney's. pending Federal Corporation Licensing Bill which would
require a license to do business in interstate commerce, the revocation of which would
suspend the right of the licensee to do an interstate business.
The permit control feature of the Tugwell Bill was violently attacked and in
subsequent bills during the five-year period of incubation of the new food law its
terms were considerably modified.
In the measure as enacted, the Secretary's powers are limited by the requirement
that he find the class of food governed by permit may become injurious to health "by
reason of contamination with micro-organisms during the manufacture, processing
or packing thereof," as well as, by the requirement that he find the injurious nature
of the food cannot be adequately determined after such article has entered into
interstate commerce. Furthermore, it will be noted that the emergency permit control
is for a "temporary period of time" and that such control may be imposed upon the
class of food in question "in any locality." It does not appear probable, therefore,
that the Emergency Permit Control section of the new statute will permit of any
broad application of the section to all manufacturing and processing of food products.
After the issuance of emergency regulations under this section, no person can
introduce into interstate commerce any food product produced or handled in such
locality unless the manufacturer, processor or packer producing such products in such
locality holds a permit issued by the Secretary. The Secretary is authorized to suspend any permit if he finds that the conditions thereof have been violated, and any
officer or employee designated by the Secretary is given access to any establishment,
the owner of which holds a permit, for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not
the conditions of the permit are being complied with. Failure to allow such inspection is a basis for revocation of the permit.
It will be seen that this emergency permit control of places of manufacture of
food products is much narrower and less drastic than was the original provision in
the Tugwell Bill, although the amount of power delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture herein is in fact as broad as any power delegated to the Secretary under the
statute and can become the power, in certain instances, to license interstate food
business.
In connection with emergency permit control, it should be remembered that
Section 704 of the statute provides that, for purposes of enforcing the law, officers or
employees duly designated by the Secretary "after first making request and obtaining
permission of the owner" are authorized to enter "at reasonable times" any factory,
warehouse, establishment or vehicle in which foods are manufactured, processed,
packed or held and to inspect at such times such factory, warehouse, establishment,
vehicle, all pertinent equipment, finished and unfinished materials, containers and
labeling. Curiously enough, while Section 704 provides that the Secretary, before
entering a factory for the purpose of inspecting the same, must secure the permission
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of the owner thereof, Section 3oi(f) of the statute relating to penalties makes it a
crime to refuse such permission.
I believe that the inspection of factories under powers granted in Section 704 will
provide information upon the basis of which permits will be required under the
Emergency Permit Control section of the law.
V. EFnFECTI

DATE AND REPEAS

It should be borne in mind that Section 9o2 of the Act specifically provides that
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 takes effect twelve months after the
date of its enactment and that the Federal Food and Drugs Act of I9O6, as amended,
remains in force until such date but is "repealed eflective upon such date." On June
25, 1939, therefore, the old food law automatically dies and with it die all of the
regulations thereunder. On the same day the new law rises, so to speak, from the
ashes of the old and it is up to the Secretary of Agriculture, under Section 7oi relating to regulations and public hearings, which became effective on June 25, 1938, so
to clothe the new statute with regulations as to make it possible for the food industry
to continue in business without any hitches or difficulties on the day that the
transition from the old law to the new law takes place. It, therefore, behooves all
members of the food industry in all branches of the industry to study the provisions
of this new law and to cooperate as much as possible with the Department of Agriculture in the evolution of new regulations under the new statute.

